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Biodiversity offsetting is changing the face of conservation practice around the world. Actions that destroy biodiversity are now increasingly acceptable because of compensatory environmental gains generated elsewhere. This change represents a seismic shift in how nature is protected, and yet its philosophical justification has received little attention. We argue that biodiversity offsetting squares most easily with a utilitarian ethic, where outcomes rather than actions are the focus. But difficulties arise when trying to account for the multiple values that people assign to biodiversity including unique, place-based value. Furthermore, the implications of defining nature as a tradeable commodity may affect our sense of obligation to protect biodiversity. Ironically, offsetting may exacerbate environmental harm because it removes an important ethical roadblock to its destruction. By failing to consider the ethical implications of biodiversity offsetting, we risk compromising the underlying motivations for protecting nature.

 “In a nutshell”
	Biodiversity offsetting schemes (those that enable biodiversity losses to be compensated by gains elsewhere) have increased in number globally.
	Many questions about the ethics of this approach to conservation are missing from the literature, yet are at the heart of public debate.
	Biodiversity offsetting resonates most strongly with an ‘outcomes-based’ form of nature conservation, rather than one focused on regulating actions.
	Current schemes do not adequately account for the multiple values that people assign to biodiversity.
	Offsetting may affect our sense of obligation to protect biodiversity by removing an important ethical roadblock to its destruction.

Introduction
The use of offsets to mitigate biodiversity losses has proliferated in recent years. Most of the approximately 51 schemes operating around the world have emerged over the last 10 years (Fig. 1). In the blink of an eye we have entered a brave new world of trading nature, often casting off traditional systems for safeguarding biodiversity from harm. 
Offsetting policies seek to compensate for biodiversity losses at an impact site by generating ecological gains elsewhere (Maron et al., 2012). This increased flexibility is intended to facilitate both economic development and environmental protection and has understandable appeal to developers and policy makers looking to avoid the outright ‘no’. Yet, there is fierce debate concerning the validity of offsetting (Vidal, 2014), with opinions divided amongst various stakeholders. For example, a recent online public consultation undertaken by the European Commission found a near 50/50 split between those who thought biodiversity offsetting was appropriate and those who disagreed with the idea (European Commission, 2015).
Likewise, opinions are divided in the scientific literature with some heralding the potential positive gains for biodiversity from offsetting (Bayon & Jenkins, 2010), and others expressing deep concerns (Walker et al., 2009). One area of concern is that offsetting results in poorer environmental outcomes for legal or political reasons. While biodiversity offsetting is intended as a ‘last resort’ to be applied exclusively to residual impacts of a project after efforts have been taken to avoid and minimise environmental harm (BBOP, 2012), political and economic motivations regularly outweigh or undermine environmental protection (Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007; Gordon et al., 2015; Walker et al., 2009). Additional concerns are grounded more in ecological science, such as the (in)ability of ecological restoration to achieve the biodiversity realities required of biodiversity offsets (Maron et al., 2012).
Some concerns, however, transcend scientific or technical reasoning. They are ethical in nature and lie at the heart of the current debate. Many conservation scientists and environmentalists disagree fundamentally with market-based conservation schemes such as biodiversity offsetting, feeling that such approaches are incongruous with nature’s intrinsic value (McCauley, 2006). Yet often these ethical concerns have been conflated with comments about the technical design of these schemes. For example, jurisdictions differ in their approaches to in-kind vs. out-of-kind offsets, with some requiring offsets to be of identical type and location while others demonstrate a more liberal approach to measuring equivalence (Bull et al., 2013). These dimensions cannot be resolved on ecological grounds alone but relate to the underlying reasons why we bother to conserve biodiversity. The same is true for the mitigation hierarchy - the sequential procedure of first avoiding and minimising biodiversity impacts and rehabilitating damaged ecosystems, before offsetting the biodiversity impacts that remain (BBOP, 2012). Without exploring the ethical implications of biodiversity offsetting we risk evaluating its technical feasibility rather than its justification according to the reasons for conservation practice (sensu Sagoff, 2013).
Ethical questions that underpin the debate about biodiversity offsetting are largely absent in both the academic literature and public discourse (but see Spash 2015 for a recent exception). For example, if it is acceptable to offset residual impacts of a development, why make any attempt to first avoid or minimise unnecessary impacts if these too can be offset without reducing net ecological outcomes? Can the protection of organisms in one place compensate for the willful destruction of others in another location? Is it necessary (or possible) to offset the reduction in quality of human life associated with biodiversity loss? If we treat nature as a tradeable commodity, do we also remove an ethical roadblock to its destruction? What does the buying and selling of biodiversity credits say about our relationship to the natural world? Here we argue that with the introduction of biodiversity offsetting as new methodology for managing biodiversity comes a need to evaluate its legitimacy according to various ethical theories.

Offsetting reflects a shift in conservation’s ethical foundations
The imperative to conserve biodiversity can be derived from multiple ethical bases, yet these are rarely made explicit within legislation. Thus, to assess the moral legitimacy of a new legal mechanism for conservation it must be scrutinised according to different schools of ethical thought.
Ethics can be broadly represented by three normative approaches: (i) consequentialist ethics (of which utilitarianism is the dominant form and will be considered here), which focuses on the expected outcomes of actions, (ii) deontological (or Kantian) ethics, which focuses on the actions themselves, and (iii) virtue ethics, which emphasises the virtues or moral character behind actions. There is great debate among ethicists concerning which approach is most robust and useful in different moral contexts, with firm advocates to be found for each (Shafer-Landau, 2012). With the rise of environmentalism, ethicists have looked to apply these traditional approaches to new environmental problems. This has proven challenging since they have all been developed to help guide actions that are made by and influence humans. For these normative approaches to inform behaviour towards the environment, either a greater recognition of the connections between people and nature, or the expansion of responsibilities to the non-human realm is required (Sarkar, 2012).
Traditional biodiversity legislation has prohibited certain actions (e.g. clearing high quality remnant vegetation or harming endangered species) according to clearly defined statutes (e.g. the ‘taking’ of endangered species under the USA’s Endangered Species Act; Ruhl, 1999). While the justification for law and policy can be derived from different ethical theories, this approach might be considered to find greatest support from a deontological frame. Deontological ethics can be either agent-centred (focused on the actor) or patient-centred (focused on the one being acted upon). Thus, when applied to the environment, justification for environmental laws either come from the moral concept that people should not harm biodiversity (agent-centred theory) or that the integrity of the environment should be upheld (patient-centred theory). Accordingly, the act of destroying biodiversity would have (and indeed has) been considered wrong and to be avoided where possible, even under challenging circumstances. In this way, biodiversity legislation was analogous to laws governing actions towards human beings. For example, the crime of assault represents a breaking of the law irrespective of any good the perpetrator may have performed beforehand or that results afterwards.
The method of biodiversity offsetting differs greatly from traditional legislation, since it emphasises outcomes rather than the activities that harm biodiversity. With biodiversity offsetting, there is no clear rule to break; one just has to find an appropriate trade. This appears to appeal to a utilitarian ethical justification. But this is not necessarily a problem. Utilitarian ethics is well-established and has been the dominant ethical system in the development of Western liberal democracy and values. Classic utilitarianism assesses an action based on the expected good that will result. This requires clear articulation of what constitutes ‘good’ (e.g. desire satisfaction or preference fulfillment) and how it can be valued. This is a key challenge in philosophy but is particularly difficult in the context of applying utilitarian ethics to biodiversity offsetting for two key reasons. First, scientifically defensible measurements of biodiversity are needed to determine a unit of trade, and second, a robust method of determining the value of a biodiversity unit is required. 

Measuring biodiversity
Determining a consistent, fungible unit of trade is especially challenging for biodiversity because it is a complex, dynamic entity comprised of multiple concepts such as species richness and rarity, ecological complementarity and function, and genetic diversity (Bull et al., 2013; Purvis and Hector 2000). Some biodiversity offsetting schemes focus on gains and losses in relation to a single aspect of biodiversity (e.g. threatened species populations or habitats), yet this approach can fail to adequately conserve the broader ecosystem elements associated with a species or population. In many other cases, metrics of trade are based on a biodiversity ‘score’ (e.g. ‘habitat hectares’; Parkes et al. 2003), which is used to trade biodiversity ‘units’ to achieve a pre-defined objective (e.g. net gain or no net loss). This method of ecological accounting is of practical convenience since it allows patches of habitat to be traded, irrespective of ecological differences. However, by conflating the many attributes of biodiversity, this practice ignores the fact that “biodiversity cannot be reduced sensibly to a single number” (Purvis and Hector 2000: 212). Some schemes have addressed this issue by prohibiting trading between different ecosystem types (out-of-kind compensation), yet ecological equivalence is difficult to achieve even with this restriction in place (Bull et al., 2013). Ultimately, the reason that defining a unit of trade is so challenging is because it is not an ecological question. Rather, it is connected to the underlying motivations for protecting biodiversity, which are often difficult to articulate (Miller, 2011).
The very presence of the mitigation hierarchy highlights a lack of confidence in our ability to measure biodiversity adequately and capture its importance. Proponents of biodiversity offsetting are quick to point out that it should only be applied to residual or ‘unavoidable’ impacts from a development. Yet at present, there has been no clear ethical explanation for why offsetting should only be applied as a ‘last resort’ within the mitigation hierarchy. If (i) scientific measurements of biodiversity are equated with their importance, (ii) biodiversity is measured accurately, and (iii) measured losses are adequately compensated for, the requirement to first avoid and minimise impacts or restore biodiversity on-site would appear unnecessary. This lack of philosophical clarity is leading to a slackening of the mitigation hierarchy, particularly when the economic costs of avoiding or minimising impacts to biodiversity far outweigh those related to offsetting. Permitting offsetting without reference to ethical reasons why it should only be applied to unavoidable impacts is resulting in offset gains being used to justify impacts that previously would not have been acceptable. 
Our lack of confidence in establishing appropriate biodiversity metrics is also revealed through legal stipulations about what types of impacts (or ecological entities) can or cannot be offset. Many jurisdictions prevent offsetting of impacts to threatened species or habitats. In this way, these offset policies are something of a hybrid of utilitarian ethics (permit biodiversity impacts yet maintain environmental ‘values’ through compensation) and deontological ethics (certain types of biodiversity are off limits). Again, the lack of philosophical clarity has led to a gradual shift between these two stances over time towards as restrictions are removed. In Australia, a leading jurisdiction in the implementation of offsets, the practice of trading biodiversity was initially highly conservative. Offsetting was applicable only for impacts on common vegetation types, requiring improvements in equivalent communities (like-for-like offsetting) (Victorian Government 2002). After increasing pressure from industry, out-of-kind offsets (i.e. gains in a different community type) were permitted, along with offsetting of listed threatened species, even those that are critically endangered. Today, biodiversity offset credits in some parts of Australia can be purchased ‘over the counter’ and can comprise of entirely disparate entities. For example, the impacts of a port development on endangered dugongs have been offset by signage to encourage recreational boat users to decrease their speed to reduce strike impacts (Gladstone Ports Corporation 2012) (see Figure 2). 

Scientific equivalence is not value equivalence
Even if it were possible to determine a consistent unit to evaluate ecological equivalence between biodiversity impacts and biodiversity offsets, this still would not be a sufficient utilitarian ethical justification of biodiversity offsetting. According to utilitarian ethics, for an outcome to be morally valid, it is not the scientific equivalence that matters, but value equivalence. This would require consideration of which values are relevant, and to whom they belong.
People assign a range of use and non-use values to nature, for example subsistence, economic, aesthetic, therapeutic, and bequest value (United Nations Environment Program 2005). Thus, the reason many people find offset agreements offensive is not merely because the biodiversity features are incomparable scientifically, but because offsets and losses are not perceived to have the same value. Moreover, the values of ecosystems that commonly matter most to people are intangible and difficult to quantify (Kenter et al., 2015), such as aesthetic beauty, cultural significance, opportunities for social interaction, or existence value. These values are rarely, if ever, accounted for in biodiversity offsetting and may require qualitative rather than quantitative techniques for adequate assessment. Of course, if one considers nature to possess intrinsic value (see Vucetich et al., 2015) (that is, its value is independent of a valuer), then biodiversity offsetting may be entirely impractical because intrinsic values cannot be measured, prioritised or traded off (Justus et al., 2009).  In some ways, the challenge of capturing the values of biodiversity is an expression of the cost-benefit analysis quandary in environmental management, whereby the aggregation of individual stated preferences according to utilitarian economic theory does not result in ultimately desirable and just public outcomes (see for example Sagoff, 2007).
Biodiversity offsetting has been compared to carbon offsetting – an approach that, while contentious, is considered by many scholars to be the most efficient way of curbing carbon emissions. However, biodiversity is quite unlike carbon. Trading tonnes of carbon is simple ethically because carbon molecules generally do not matter to people. The value that is assigned to carbon is representative of its influence on other things that are valued such as human life, ecological outcomes and economic systems. Applying a market mechanism to biodiversity is much more ethically complex because biodiversity itself is valued by people and these values typically pertain to specific species, habitats and ecosystems. 
Another key consideration according to utilitarian ethics is whose values are considered in a decision. Using ecological features alone to calculate numerical scores for habitat patches assumes that biodiversity is valued equally everywhere by everyone. Of course, this assumption is inappropriate, since different people will assign greater or lesser value to biodiversity for many reasons beyond its ecological condition or composition. Indeed, people’s attachment to specific places is often highly significant (Low & Altman, 1992) and related to unique meanings that certainly cannot be traded between different locations. Consider the offsetting of biodiversity losses in the fringes of urban settlements arising from new housing developments (Bekessy et al. 2010). Creating offset sites away from where the biodiversity is being destroyed means that nature-based recreation and environmental education opportunities are lost, natural amenity and environmental health is reduced, and places that shaped unique memories are dramatically transformed (see Figure 3). Thus, it is unlikely that the offset sites will be valued in the same way or to the same degree as the original biodiversity located proximal to where people live. Further, while the economic and social gains resulting from development projects may appear very large, they are typically concentrated to a small number of people. In contrast, the instrumental values of natural ecosystems are typically diffuse yet benefit many (Rolston 1988).
Is it possible to account adequately for the range of values that are associated with biodiversity in order for offsetting to be ethically viable? While some recent progress has been made in ecosystem services research along these lines (Daniel et al. 2012; Jax et al. 2013), accounting for the values of biodiversity remains a daunting task and currently no biodiversity offsetting scheme comes close to measuring all of these values.

Offsetting may undermine environmental virtues
Permitting the buying and selling of nature may work against engendering respectful, positive societal attitudes towards nature: the motivation for conservation according to a virtue ethics frame. Hursthouse (2007) notes that environmentalists routinely identify traditional vices as underpinning environmental problems, such as greed and self-indulgence. She argues for a new ‘virtue’ – respect for nature – which, if pursued could help stay environmental degradation including biodiversity loss. While offsetting might make it economically less viable to destroy biodiversity, it rests on the assumption that the there is nothing wrong per se with the manipulation and trading of nature, and therefore may undermine such a virtue. This danger is highlighted by Goodin (1994), who draws a comparison between the monetization of nature and the selling of ‘indulgences’ by Catholic clergy in the middle ages, whereby monetary payment was given in remittance for sinful living. 
Furthermore, a utilitarian ethic for environmental protection may actually exacerbate environmental harm. In their well-known study of childcare centres in Israel, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) showed that the introduction of late pick-up fees resulted in more parents arriving late to collect their children: a trend that persisted even when the fee was abolished. Commodification of the ‘late-pick up service’ changed the ethical basis for punctuality from a respect for the teacher to a market based on a willingness to pay for a service. In the same way, offsetting schemes may be less effective at preventing the loss of biodiversity because there can be no ‘guilt’ attached to the act of buying a commodity at will (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000). 

Conclusion
Biodiversity offsetting has charged into the world of conservation. Yet, offsetting represents a different ethical approach to protecting nature from that of traditional conservation legislation. Instead of permitting or restricting actions, offsetting is based on maintaining overall ecological value. Even if one does not object fundamentally to the trading of nature, offsetting policies remain deeply problematic because they do not measure the range of values that people associate with biodiversity. Ironically, offsetting may exacerbate environmental harm because it removes an important ethical roadblock to its destruction. It is critical therefore that we pause to consider the ethical implications of this change. Indeed, offsetting raises broader questions about how we should measure impacts to biodiversity, the level of impact we are willing to accept and what motivates our desire to avoid such impacts. Thus, rather than accepting the inevitable rise of biodiversity offsetting, perhaps it is time to reassess conservation’s ethical foundations to ensure that the systems designed to conserve biodiversity are protecting what really matters.
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Figure 1. Increase in offset schemes around the world. The pie chart presents a break down of this data by region. Of the approximately 51 operational schemes (including compulsory and voluntary schemes and those under trial), most have emerged over the last 10 years. Data were collated via a review of academic and grey literature and consultation with academic experts on biodiversity offsetting.

Figure 2. Impacts to dugongs (a) from a port development in Gladstone Harbour, Queensland Australia have been offset using out-of-kind gains. The scale of the impacts to the system is clearly pronounced when comparing photographs from before (b) and after (c) the development. All photographs courtesy of Kiwi, Australian Marine Conservation Society.

Figure 3. A residential development site in northern Melbourne whereby impacts to the grassland ecosystem were offset elsewhere. Installations of metal wildlife statues as part of an interpretive walk only serve to highlight the tragic loss of biodiversity from the area. Photo by Caroline Speed.
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